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Abstract 
 
 
The purpose of this work is two-fold.  The first is to relate the theory of 
liberal peace to the notion of economic diplomacy. The second objective of 
this essay is to relate the greater economic globalization outcome of economic 
diplomacy, and its counterpart liberal peace objective, to the incidence and 
nature of domestic conflict. Nowadays, civil war has become the dominant 
form of war, mainly in developing countries. But other forms of social 
conflict and unrest short of war are also emerging, especially in the wake of 
the growing global tide of rising inequality and relative deprivation since the 
current phase of globalization gathered pace after circa 1980. This is also 
reflected in voting in democratic countries, for example the referendum in 
favour of Brexit in 2016. A game theoretic model of interaction between the 
state and a dissident group over the degree of globalization is also presented. 
 
 
This version: 11 January 2016.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* I am grateful to Peter Bergeijk for invaluable comments on previous drafts. I have drawn on my 
earlier work on the liberal peace; Murshed (2010), chapter 7.  
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Introduction 
 
‘Commerce is the grand panacea’, said Richard Cobden (1835), when he alluded to 
the pacific and civilizing effects of international trade and its role in assuaging 
tensions between nations. Similarly, John Stuart Mill (1848, Principles of Political 
Economy, III.XVII.4) spoke of the ‘intellectual and moral’ benefits of international 
commerce. Besides preventing conflict between peoples1, it allowed society to learn 
from other nations leading to its advancement well beyond the mere pecuniary sphere.  
In contemporary political science the term liberal peace is employed to explain the 
absence of armed conflict between democratic nations that are also economically 
interdependent. The expression, liberal peace, therefore, has an economic dimension, 
as well as an element based on a common polity and values. Ultimately, these two 
strands of the liberal peace are inseparably linked; the literature on the liberal peace, 
however, may be dichotomised into ideal and economic theories. The ideal theory can 
be traced to Immanuel Kant’s notions of foedus pacificum (league of peace) in his 
essay on the Perpetual Peace (1795) where the simultaneous adoption of a republican 
constitution by different nations generates a cosmopolitan peace. Its modern 
counterpart is to be found in the contemporary philosopher, John Rawls’ (1999) ideas. 
Economic theories of the liberal peace probably date back to Montesquieu’s views 
(1748) regarding the pacific benefits of economic exchange between peoples; a 
review of contemporary thinking may be found in Gartzke (2007), where it is labelled 
the ‘capitalist’ peace.  
 
Gleditsch (2008) has outlined a liberal ‘tripod’ where common democratic values, 
joint membership of international organisations and economic inter-dependence 
together buttress the ‘liberal’ peace. The term ‘liberal’ internationalist should be 
underscored in this regard, to distinguish this school of thought from ‘realist’ strands 
in political science and international relations. This view, in the extreme, regards 
nation states as existing in a state of non-contractual anarchy vis-à-vis each other, 
making the exercise of power, or the gathering of power by war, a calculated 
opportunistic act. Yet there are notions that a common set of values, and/or inter-
state commerce will moderate or eliminate these war-like tendencies; see, for 
example, Doyle (1986).  
The purpose of this work is two-fold.  The first is to relate the theory of liberal peace 
to the notion of economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy has been defined by 
Bergeijk (2009, chapter 1, page 14) as the either the use of political means to foster 
bilateral inter-state economic flows, or the use of economic means to promote 
peaceful political goals such as greater inter-state cooperation, increasing the cost of 
inter-state war, or to do the reverse: punish ‘errant’ nations via economic sanctions 
and commercial boycotts. Economic diplomacy is primarily understood to be bilateral 
(between pairs of nation states), but multilateral fora (the European Union is the 
foremost example) are also important instruments of economic diplomacy because it 
strengthens the institutional framework for achieving liberal peace objectives. Given 
                                                 
1 Advanced nations can, however, be driven by mercantalistic (monoplostic) gains from trade motives 
to wage war against smaller less ‘civilised’ countries, as during the colonial era. For example, Kant 
(1795) deplores the rapacious activities of the British East India Company in Bengal. Mill, who was as 
an employee of the East India Company until its abolishment in 1858, is widely regarded as a liberal 
imperialist, and was without doubt an advocate of British imperial expansion in the Indian sub-
continent, on the grounds of mission civilisatrice of British rule (Tunick, 2006).    
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the fact that for most nation states, save the largest and economically most powerful, 
conduct their ‘higher’ trade policy governing tariffs, quotas and trade regulations via 
trading blocks and free trade agreements, economic diplomacy becomes more salient 
as it allows for more informal contact and trade promotion, during overseas visits by 
dignitaries, or even at the sectoral or firm level by diplomats and captains of industry.   
Thus, it can be readily deduced that economic diplomacy is crucial to the construction 
of at least one of the pillars of the liberal peace, namely economic inter-dependence 
between nations. Arguably, even the construction of the common democratic values 
pillar of the liberal peace edifice is aided by economic diplomacy. And common 
membership of international organisations, an important pillar of the liberal tripod, 
also assists in the conduct of economic diplomacy, if only by augmenting the 
bargaining power of member states.   
The second objective of this essay is to relate the greater economic globalization 
outcome of economic diplomacy, and its counterpart liberal peace objective, to the 
incidence and nature of domestic conflict. Nowadays, civil war has become the 
dominant form of war, mainly in developing countries; see, Murshed (2010). But 
other forms of social conflict and unrest short of war are also emerging, especially in 
the wake of the growing global tide of rising inequality and relative deprivation since 
the current phase of globalization gathered pace after circa 1980.  
The remainder of the work is organised as follows: the next section examines theories 
of the liberal peace, followed by how greater economic globalization relates to 
internal conflict, ending with a brief conclusion. There is a game theoretic model 
contained in the appendix describing interaction between the state and a dissident 
group in the context of greater globalization and democratic values engendered by 
globalization (including economic diplomacy) with the goals of the liberal peace in 
mind.   
 
1 Theories of the Liberal Peace 
 
Immanuel Kant in his essay on the Perpetual Peace (1795) argues that although war is 
the natural state of man2, peace can be established through design. This requires the 
adoption of a republican constitution simultaneously by all nations, which inter alia 
would check the war-like tendencies of monarchs and the citizenry; the 
cosmopolitanism that would emerge among the comity of nations would preclude 
war.3  
 
Kant’s (1795) essay on the ‘Perpetual Peace’ provides us with clues as to the nature of 
the republican constitution. First, observe the usage of the expression ‘perpetual’, 
implying permanence as opposed to a transient truce. Secondly, and most crucially, 
Kant refers to the separation of powers between the executive and legislature (this 
ensures their proper and efficient functioning); we may also add the independence of 
the judiciary. Put simply, this concept implies good government that holds the 
domestic social contract together. Thirdly, the stability of the peace depends upon the 
                                                 
2 Akin to Thomas Hobbes’ conception of the non-contractual ‘state of nature’.  
3 This could also create a confederation of nations with common values, such as with the European 
Union’s acquis communautaire. 
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source of sovereignty or legitimate power within the nation. Although not enamoured 
of certain forms of rabble-led democracy, Kant nevertheless points out that good 
governance provided by a dictator or an absolute monarch is inherently unstable as he 
or his successors face temptations to deviate from good government, and the 
assurance of good governance is more forthcoming in a system of power that is 
representative of the people. Central to the Kantian republican constitution is a system 
of checks and balances or a separation of powers which are largely absent from the 
fledgling democracies that characterise the developing world at present.  
 
Mirroring Kant’s thoughts, is the contemporary philosopher, John Rawl’s (1999) 
notion of peace between liberal societies, whom he refers to as peoples and not states. 
Rawls’ Law of Peoples is inspired by Kant’s foedus pacificum and is termed a 
‘realistic utopia’. There is an appeal to both natural law and the possible 
implementation of an ideal morality. An ideal state is reasonable, even if in an 
imperfect world it is rational to deviate from such optima. He speaks of well-ordered 
peoples. These are mainly constitutional liberal democracies, who arrive at this 
arrangement based on ideas of public reason. Rawls argues that liberal societies do 
not go to war with each other because their needs are satisfied, they are non-
acquisitive in the sense of not wishing to grow beyond an achieved steady-state level 
of (presumably high) income, and they are tolerant of difference. Thus, there cannot 
be excessive or unacceptable inequality in such a community. They will, in theory, 
only fight in self-defence, and only invade to prevent gross human rights abuses such 
as genocide in other countries.  
 
The liberal view that trade between nations directly contributes to peace harks back 
to the Baron de Montesquieu’s, Spirit of the Laws (1748), where he states that 
commerce tends to promote peace between nations; mutual self-interest precludes 
war; trade also softens attitudes of peoples towards each other. The fact that 
commerce promotes peace was also pointed out by Tom Paine (1791-2, page 265). 
Similar views were aired more strongly by Richard Cobden (1835). Sir Normal 
Angell (1910) asserted that nations could never enrich themselves through war, and 
even a victorious nation would come off economically worse from a war. Angell’s 
(1910) view about the irrationality of war between the great powers of Europe in 
1910 was based on a universal notion of rationality; bounded or limited rationality 
can never rule out wars, especially in the presence of misperceptions such as an 
exaggerated view of the probability of victory. Consensual exchange or trade is the 
peaceful means of economically benefiting from the endowments of another 
country. The other means is war, representing the forceful acquisition of another 
country’s resources—the mercantilist wars of 17th century and the various colonial 
wars of conquest from the 16th-19th centuries offer numerous examples of these.    
 
Polachek (1997) made the case for the purest form of the economic liberal peace, 
arguing that a common polity (democracy) is largely immaterial. He presents 
empirical evidence to suggest that advanced democracies cooperate, not because of 
their similar political systems, but due to their vast and multiply intersecting 
economic inter-dependence. War disrupts these networks, and is therefore against 
the interests of the nation states who are thus connected. 
 
While all analysts agree that war impedes trade, the ‘realist’ view is that countries 
may choose to disrupt their potential enemy’s gains from trade by ceasing trading 
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with them, even if this means hostilities. Barbieri and Levy (1999), using an 
interrupted time series framework found little impact of war on trading relationships 
for seven dyads from 1870. They argue that any disruption to bilateral trade caused 
by war is, in many instances, remedied after peace emerges. Both trade and war 
produce winners and losers. Even if there are losses to the aggregate economy from 
war or diminished trade, some groups may gain, and these groups may be the more 
politically influential. Anderton and Carter (2001), however, dispute these findings.  
 
Polachek and Seiglie (2006) maintain that wars and disputes between geographically 
contiguous states involve substantial losses, as more efficient geographically 
proximate trade is displaced.  At the same time, the absence of trade between 
neighbours also increases the probability of conflict. Robst, Polachek and Chang 
(2007) demonstrate that geographical proximity has a greater conflict enhancing 
effect when two nations fail to realize opportunities for trade.  
  
During the two world wars of the 20th century, highly interdependent economies 
went to total war with each other. Consequently, the economic inter-dependence 
argument for peace needs re-examination. Hegre (2000) argued that economic inter-
dependence reinforces peace, but mainly between more developed economies. 
Russet and Oneal (2001) point out that it is the economic dependence on trade of the 
least dependent on the other member of a group of nations that will determine the 
pacific effect of trade.  
 
Among the updates proposed for the liberal peace theory based on economic inter-
dependence is the ‘capitalist’ peace notion of Gartzke (2007). He argues that the 
intensity of trade is only one factor in the peace engendered by capitalism. The nature 
of advanced capitalism makes territorial disputes, which are mainly contests over 
resources, less likely as the market mechanism allows easier access to resources. The 
nature of production makes the output of more sophisticated goods and services 
increasingly reliant on ‘ideas’ that are research and development intensive, and skilled 
personnel can be acquired through more open global labour markets. Moreover, the 
disruption to integrated financial markets makes war less likely between countries 
caught up in that web of inter-dependence. We are all acutely aware of how disruptive 
financial crises and the resultant contagion that spreads all over the world are.4 
Gartzke (2007) argues that common foreign policy goals reflected in the membership 
of international treaty organisations (NATO, the European Union etc.) also produces 
peace. 
 
Dorussen and Ward (2010) rehabilitate the role of trade in engendering peace. They 
argue that trade has important indirect effects over and above the inter-dependence 
induced by bilateral trade. Increased trade generally, may do little to mollify war-like 
tendencies between a pair of countries, but if each of these countries interacts 
considerably with third countries, it will be not in their interests to go to war with 
each other, as it disrupts other links and networks. In other words, any two countries 
are unlikely to go to war with each other if there trade with the rest of the world is 
substantial even when their bilateral trade dependence is low. Murshed and Mamoon 
(2010) find evidence of this in their study of the effects of trade and democracy on 
                                                 
4 For example, the Wall Street crash of October 1929 heralded the world-wide Great Depression of the 
1930s; the effects of the flawed regulation of US sub-prime lending markets produced the global 
financial crisis.  
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India-Pakistan conflict. India and Pakistan are not only hostile towards each other, but 
their bilateral trade is very low compared to what would be predicted by their close 
proximity. Multilateral trade with the rest of the world has the greatest hostility 
reducing effect; however, the bilateral trade between these two countries is impeded 
by conflict, just as the limited value of trade is conflict enhancing. There is, however, 
a reverse causality here.  Multilateral trade with the rest of the world reduces hostility 
between India and Pakistan, but their mutual mistrust and hostility attenuates their 
bilateral trade. Hence economic diplomacy would be useful in this context. 
  
This modern view of the liberal peace can be summarized as asserting that similar, 
contiguous democracies at a high level of economic development will not fight each 
other (Gartzke, 2007). Democracies may go to war with other democracies that are 
distantly located, culturally disparate and considerably poorer. Democracies or liberal 
societies that descend into poverty, or fall behind other affluent nations because of the 
lack of growth following systemic changes such as the collapse of socialism may turn 
to aggression; see Wenar and Milanovic (2009) on this. What is also required for 
peace in a pair-wise dyadic sense between nations is not just democracy and 
economic inter-dependence, but also high levels of development (Hegre, 2000), as 
high income nations have most to lose from war with one another. Papers by Bussman 
(2010), as well as Polachek, Seiglie and Xiang (2012) demonstrate using national 
dyads (pairs of nation states) that the stock and flow of foreign direct investment also 
reduces hostile behaviour (not just confined to war) between nation states.  
 
Economic diplomacy is essential to building the pillars and achieving the goals of 
the liberal peace. This is so both in the bilateral sense (between pairs of nation 
states), as the India-Pakistan case illustrates, but also in the multilateral context. 
Arguably, the European Union is the international organisation par excellence in 
providing the mechanisms for building and strengthening all three pillars of the 
liberal tripod.    
 
3 Globalization and Internal Conflict  
 
It is worthwhile revisiting the gains from trade. The static textbook gain is that 
international trade increases the utility of the ‘representative’ consumer by providing 
a superior consumption bundle at a better set of relative prices.5 This is mainly 
because imported goods are cheaper compared to the autarkic situation. What are the 
distributional consequences of increased world trade among the various sectors of the 
economy? After an expansion of trade, the factors of production employed in the 
exportable sector will witness a rise in their remuneration. This is because the 
exportable sectors of the economy expand, and the import-competing sectors contract, 
after increased international trade. It is immediately apparent that globalization 
produces winners and losers.6 For example, with the end of the multi-fibre agreement 
which governed and restricted the import of garments from developing countries into 
OECD nations, the remaining European Union producers (in countries like Portugal) 
                                                 
5 Provided that this consumer is not pauperized by the process.  
6 In developing countries (mainly in Asia) that have experienced an increase in their export of unskilled 
labour intensive goods (mainly garments) one would expect a rise in the remuneration of the unskilled 
relative to the skilled. But this has not happened because of the shortage of skilled personnel (as a 
result of low public education expenditure in the presence of a substantial military budget), and the 
presence of surplus labour; see Mamoon and Murshed (2008).   
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were hurt by Chinese exports, so they successfully lobbied for, and obtained a re-
imposition of import controls. Mamoon and Murshed (2008) find evidence that trade 
liberalization has widened the skilled-unskilled worker real wage gap. It may be 
argued that the immiserization of unskilled labour may not take place in the context of 
intra-industry trade expansion context (for example when France and Germany sell 
cars to one another), but much of the intra-industry trade today is in components of 
manufactured goods, where the factor proportions theories of distribution still apply.   
 
The question then is whether or not society is in a position and prepared to 
compensate the losers from increased trade. If there is economic growth following 
globalization the gainers gain is greater than the loss of the losers; there is a potential 
for compensating the losers, provided enough political will exists to affect the re-
distribution. Policies that aim at greater economic integration or globalization have 
the potential for increasing internal conflict because they produce winners and losers, 
particularly if such policies are a limited success or a failure in countries that 
experienced stagnation and growth failure in the last two decades of the 20th century, 
such as in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of the erstwhile Soviet Union (Central Asian 
republics without oil or gas) and even Latin America.7 On the other hand, the 
economic variant of the liberal peace argues that societies that have achieved greater 
degrees of openness to international trade and finance are more peaceful. How do we 
reconcile these two opposing forces? 
 
Bussman and Schneider (2007) argue that policies aimed at greater globalization lead 
to a conflict risk increasing outcome, but highly open economies cannot sustain high 
levels of international trade and foreign direct investment inflows if they are in 
conflict, especially in the form of civil war. Indeed, they find empirical evidence to 
support these findings in a cross sectional econometric investigation of conflict risk.  
 
Traditionally, economic inequality has been thought to be growth enhancing, as the 
rich were regarded to save more and invest in productive capacity. That view has, 
however, been modified in recent times especially given the growing trend for rising 
inequality in most countries worldwide since about 1980; see Jayadev, Lahoti and 
Reddy (2015).8  Traditional arguments against excessive inequality were grounded in 
‘equity’ considerations based on society’s aversion to highly unequal outcomes. A 
modicum of unequal outcomes as a reward for differential effort, talent and risk 
taking can be regarded as fair, but what is both unjust and inefficient is inequality of 
opportunity (Roemer, 1998), which may be rooted in either systematic discrimination 
or unequal access to opportunities such as education. It can be argued that present day 
trends in the distribution of income with the accelerating share of the top 1% in the 
global income distribution produces inequality of opportunity and hampers inter-
generational mobility, particularly because much of the wealth of the wealthiest is 
principally attributable to a rent earned from speculative financial investments. In the 
ultimate analysis, in the presence of many market imperfections, adverse selection, 
substantial economic rents and inequality of opportunity, the separability between the 
efficiency and equity arguments against inequality fall apart, but above all make 
social protection and redistributive policies justifiable.  
 
                                                 
7 Even though growth in all developing countries picked up at the turn of the millennium, it remains to 
be seen if the growth is sustained after the petering out of the commodity price boom of the last decade.  
8 The exception seems to be in Latin America in recent years, in countries such as Brazil.  
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Earlier, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) showed that where there is distributive conflict 
between the haves and the have nots, a high degree of inequality may damage future 
growth prospects.  Recently, Dabla-Norris et. Al (2015) and Ostry, Berg and 
Tsangarides (2014) show that the recent growth experiences of a cross-section of 
developed and developing countries suggest that excessive inequality is indeed 
harmful to growth prospects. This could be because greater inequality leaves 
economies more prone to financial crises9, greater inequality results in less human 
capital accumulation, and because inequality contains within it the seeds of conflict, 
which is harmful for growth. On the causes of recent rises in income inequality, 
Dabla-Norris et. Al (2015) point out that unskilled labour saving technical progress, 
financial globalisation (but not trade openness) and less regulation of labour markets, 
including the informalisation of work are the chief culprits. Easterly (2007) 
demonstrated that a higher middle class share of income does promote growth, 
because the middle classes traditionally lobby for more growth enhancing public 
goods, including publicly funded education and health care.  
 
In a similar vein, redistributive policies, including social protection expenditures 
which were earlier regarded to result in a distortionary tax burden for the economy do 
not seem to harm growth prospects (Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, 2014) in recent 
cross-country empirical analysis. In other words, the case against redistributive 
policies based on the distortionary impact of the fiscal (tax, transfer) system may be 
invalid in the presence of excessive inequality. Hence, the well-known efficiency-
equity trade-off no longer applies in recent years.   
 
Rodrik (1999) argues that social conflict measured by indicators such as inequality, 
unless managed by well-functioning institutions can lead to growth collapses. In other 
words, persistent inequality destabilises society and the social contract; this may 
produce social conflict, even if it is not full-blown armed conflict.10 He also argued 
(Rodrik, 1998) that more open or more globalised economies need to have greater 
government expenditure, including more social protection spending, in order to 
cushion citizens against the idiosyncratic and cyclical risks that increased exposure to 
world markets brings.  
 
This leads us to the political economy considerations, as the choice and 
implementation of policies by the state are fundamentally the outcome of strategic 
interaction between different interested parties, in this case the haves and the have 
nots. The pressure for redistribution results in the early democratic contract 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2009) with some power transferred to the less affluent, and 
consequently some redistribution. Downs’ (1957) famous median voter theory 
suggests that the median voter’s preferences will prevail in a democracy. Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) suggest that increases in the size of government in democracies are 
due to either the extension of the franchise (which lowers the median voter’s mean 
income), or if economic growth makes the increased per-capita income greater than 
that of the median voter, who will prefer more government social sector expenditure. 
But the median voter’s interests seem to be overridden by the economic interests of 
                                                 
9 This is because the extremely wealthy demand a high return to their financial investments, and the 
financial debt burden of the relatively poor if securitized can make economies more prone to financial 
crises, which in turn can cause major recessions.     
10 Inequality between distinct ethnic groups, a concept known as horizontal inequality, can be a major 
cause of civil war; see, for example, Murshed (2010), chapter 3.  
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the rich and powerful who value social protection much less, and are in favour of its 
private provision so as to further enrich themselves. This is precisely what has 
occurred in most high and middle income countries in recent years where mean 
income has risen relative to median income, implying greater inequality. There has 
been greater globalization, economic diplomacy and the objectives of the liberal peace 
between nations have been met, but at the cost of greater inequality and domestic 
social cohesion. The remedy lies in greater social protection. In recent times, the 
greatest body blow to the goals of the liberal peace was rendered by the outcome of 
the British referendum to leave the European Union where 51.9% of those who cast 
ballots voted to leave, and the preliminary analysis of the leave vote suggests that the 
those with below mean incomes: the marginalised, less educated and unskilled 
production workers were most likely to vote leave. For example, Uberoi (2016) 
indicates that there is a statistically significant positive correlation between the 
proportion of non-graduates (unskilled workers) and the leave vote based on the data 
for electoral districts for this referendum.  Similar, arguments can be made in the case 
of the rejection of the EU-Canada trade by the relatively poorer Walonian part of 
Belgium, and even in the Dutch referendum which rejected the treaty with Ukraine.   
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The liberal view is that peace is engendered by common values and peaceful 
economic exchange. When it comes to interaction between nation states since the late 
19th century, common democratic values and greater commerce can achieve peace, 
albeit with notable exceptions as during the Great War of 1914-1918. But the goals of 
the liberal peace require mechanisms for achieving its ends. Economic diplomacy is a 
powerful means of achieving that liberal peace end, mainly in the bilateral sphere. It is 
also a means of supplementing formal trade agreements via informal means. In other 
words, economic diplomacy is the chief instrument of the liberal peace in the inter-
state sphere. But multilateral mechanisms in the shape of international associational 
organisations are the third, and arguably, most important pillar of the liberal peace. 
The chief example of this is the European Union with its economic, political, social 
protection, educational, scientific and security agendas for cooperation. Economic 
diplomacy still has a place within the Union, as groups or nations can lobby decision 
makers, and the economic diplomacy conducted between trading blocs is of great 
importance to member states of the European Union. The bargaining power of all but 
the very few larger nations of the world are enhanced and best served in bilateral 
negotiations between economic or trading blocs.  
 
The liberal peace, along with its chief instrument economic diplomacy, has been a 
remarkable success in the inter-state sphere. Where the corollary of the liberal peace 
in the form of free trade has been found wanting is in connection with the growing 
inequality that has gathered pace along with accelerated economic globalization since 
1980. Thus, although average incomes may increase as a consequence of greater 
globalization, the median household’s income may have fallen relative to the mean. 
This inequality destabilises society, and in some cases can contribute to outright civil 
war. The answer lies in greater social protection expenditure, which is much less 
distortionary than previously thought. Redistribution will help to serious inter-
generational inequalities of opportunity, as well as constituting a potential Pareto 
improvement in social welfare, as the gainers from globalization are well positioned 
to compensate the losers through the fiscal (tax) and public spending mechanisms.  
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Perhaps, the greatest setback to the liberal peace in recent times is the British 
referendum result in June 2016 calling for the UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union.11 Nor does it make sense from an international realpolitik standpoint. The 
misguided median voter may have thought that Brexit would release more resources 
for domestic social expenditure and redistribution, which is unlikely in the prevailing 
privatised and managerial model of providing public services. The average leave voter 
may also have implicitly believed that restricting immigration will improve the 
earnings prospects of unskilled (production and service sector) workers. This cannot 
occur without far reaching capital controls. Mundell (1957) demonstrated that the free 
movement of capital is sufficient to achieve factor price equalisation; hence, the 
wages of the unskilled are likely to remain low or fall towards the levels of their 
counterparts in Eastern Europe. Also, the idea of repatriating sovereignty in an age 
when national sovereignty is diminishing is also chimerical.      
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APPENDIX: GLOBALIZATION, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 
 
The model below is closely related to the model in Murshed and Mamoon (2010). 
There are two opposing groups, which for the sake of convenience, we refer to as the 
government and the dissidents or rebels, although the opposition group may not be 
engaged in armed conflict with the state. The two groups are indexed by subscripts G 
and R respectively. The government refers to the ruling classes, and the dissident 
groups are the proscribed, excluded or marginalized. Inequalities in income, wealth, 
education, health status, political influence, and above all enduring inequalities of 
opportunity divide the two groups. In some societies open war characterises their 
antagonism, in others violent clashes are the form their confrontation takes, and in 
still others the deep resentment of the economic and political inequalities between the 
two groups leads to mainly non-violent protest. The conflict between the two groups 
may be episodic, but the antipathy is omnipresent, and the material chasm between 
the haves and have nots enduring.     
 
Imagine two states of nature, denoted by superscripts: one more peaceful or dovish 
(D), and the other associated with greater hawkishness (H). The former is 
characterised by less confrontation between the two groups and the rulers attempt to 
mollify the disadvantaged. The probabilities of the two states are defined to be  and 
1 - , respectively. The probability of either state is in turn affected by actions and 
efforts; (a) for the government and (e) for the rebels or dissidents. These are also the 
strategic variables employed by the two sides in their strategic interaction with each 
other. The probability of the peaceful state  rises with the input of action and effort 
by the two sides, but at diminishing rates.  
 
Interestingly, the two strategic choice variables are in the inverse of conflict, as they 
pertain to peaceful behaviour. One can imagine a range of activities by one or both 
sides if they wish to promote peace, including a greater willingness to compromise, 
promote inclusion and devote more resources directed towards peaceful economic 
development or social protection by the government and so on.  
 
Actions and efforts to seek peace entail costs for each party. The costs of actions to 
promote peace can take a variety of forms; among them there is the loss of face to 
either party’s own hawkish political constituencies simply for appearing to capitulate. 
Increased globalization may, however, augment the stock of rhetoric available to 
leaders who wish to push their ‘peace’ agenda through the political process. Secondly, 
and in a more palpable sense, increased international economic interaction, and the 
growth it brings, may provide the additional resources to buy off domestic ‘war’ 
lobbies. A more democratic government, in developing countries, may use its 
mandate from the people to justify greater peace, social protection expenditure and 
reduced military spending. Even in more established democracies, greater democracy, 
as modelled below, leads to more social protection expenditure, which raises the 
probability of peace.      
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The expected utility of the government is given by 
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Where G
DU and G
HU denote utilities or pay-offs in dovish and hawkish states 
respectively, weighted by the probabilities of the two states. DG
D
G SE  , 
H
G
H
G SE  indicate the exogenous pair of payoffs from non-security related public 
consumption12 and security expenditure respectively in the less belligerent and more 
belligerent states respectively. The difference is that in dovish state security spending 
is lower and public consumption higher than in the hawkish state. Most importantly, 
the dovish state of nature will imply greater poverty reduction, leading to lesser future 
inequality and grievances on the part of the excluded. Z is the cost function of 
undertaking the action, a. Action, a, increases the probability of peace,, however, 
undertaking it entails a cost, as described above. T indicates greater globalization 
(more trade with the rest of the world, greater inward investment from abroad as well 
as other financial flows), and this is postulated to reduce the cost of making peace via 
the cost function (Z) as discussed above, Za1 < 0, but so does a hybrid concept called 
increased democratisation (P) for the government (Za2 <0), as more democratic 
governments are clearly mandated to make peace and spend more on poverty and 
inequality reduction. Also, a > 0, but aa < 0; there are diminishing returns to these 
actions. Both Za > 0 and Zaa > 0.  
 
Turning to the rebels or dissidents, we symmetrically have 
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R
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RR    (2) 
 
L is the cost of effort, e, which increases the probability of peace, . As with the 
government, greater globalization may lower the marginal cost of making peaceful 
concessions, but it may harden grievances if greater globalization impoverishes this 
group and produces greater inequality as it has done in most countries, developed and 
developing; therefore, Le1 < ?. Also, e > 0, but ee < 0, Le > 0, and Lee > 0.  
 
In the non-cooperative Cournot-Nash game each side maximises its own utility 
function above with respect to its own choice variable a and e; in effect equating the 
marginal benefit of its strategic action on the left hand side with its marginal cost on 
the right hand side:  
 
  aHGDGa ZUU  )()(        (3) 
 
and 
  eHPRDRe LUU  )()(        (4) 
 
                                                 
12 Public consumption can include health, education expenditure, social security spending and 
programmes related to poverty reduction.  
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Greater globalisation via successful economic diplomacy changes the marginal cost of 
peaceful behaviour (Za1, Le1). Analytically this means a change in the first-order 
conditions for both sides to:  
 
  dTZUU aHGDGa 1)()(        (5) 
 
  dTLUU eHRDRe 1)()(        (6) 
 
This pertains to the trade effects of the liberal peace. For the government side, the cost 
of making peace declines on the right hand side of (5) as Za1 < 0. But for the rebels, if 
they are disadvantaged by globalization, the costs could rise in (6) and Le1 > 0. There 
could be greater conflict, unless globalization is broad based enough to also advantage 
the rebels. The costs of peaceful actions may also be easier to bear if the government 
becomes more democratic, causing the first order condition for the government to 
become (Za2 < 0):  
 
  dPZUU aHGDGa 2)()(         (7) 
  
Note that in Equations (3) and (4) each side will equate its marginal benefit from 
exercising their own strategic choice to the corresponding marginal cost. Each side's 
strategic choices will depend on the first order conditions given in Equations (3) and 
(4), along with a fixed conjecture about the opposition's strategic choice. These lead 
to the (linear) reaction functions for both sides, obtained by totally differentiating 
Equations (3) and (4) with respect to a and e. For the government this is indicated by 
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and for the rebels and dissidents by 
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Note that ae = ea by symmetry.  
 
The reaction functions are positively sloped if ae > 0, implying that the two strategies 
are complements. This is the standard assumption in the literature on conflict. In our 
model, however, we postulate that ae < 0, the choice variables are strategic 
substitutes, and the reaction functions slope downwards (Figure 1). This can occur 
because the strategy space is defined in terms of peace; see Murshed (2010). The idea 
is that the stronger side can free ride on the activities of the weaker side. The latter 
group has to do more to achieve the Pareto optimal outcome, and consequently incurs 
more costs---hence the stronger side free rides on the weaker party.  Thus, if one side 
behaves more peacefully it increases the utility of both parties and the other side may 
free ride on this action by not bringing about a corresponding increase in their action.  
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Figure 1: Reaction Functions  for Government and Rebels 
RG2 
RG1 
RR1 
RR2 
 
 
In Figure 2, two non-cooperative equilibria are illustrated by points N and C 
respectively. Point C is more cooperative and peaceful with greater inter-country 
trade, less inequality and poverty reduction. A shift from N to C can occur because of 
greater globalisation (rise in T) because of, say, the establishment of a free trade area 
after a successful episode of economic diplomacy, and increased international (not 
necessarily just bilateral) trade lowers the marginal cost of peaceful behaviour for 
both sides domestically if it is inclusive (Za1, Le1< 0). Analytically, this follows the 
changes denoted in (5) and (6) above.  
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Figure 2:  Comparative Statics 
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Conversely, a movement from C to N could represent more inward looking behaviour 
by both domestic parties in a retreat from globalization by reneging on earlier 
multilateral economic agreements. A contemporary example is Brexit, or the British 
desire to leave the European Union. Here the median voter, whose income was below 
the mean, making him a member of the dissident group was given a chance to retreat 
from globalization given his imperfect perception about his improved prospects in a 
less globalised economy. Mundell (1957) showed that as long as one factor of 
production, say capital, is internationally mobile, factor price equalisation can take 
place; British low-productivity and low-skilled wages may be driven down to levels 
of Polish wages in the same sectors, even if Polish workers are not permitted to work 
in Britain. 
 
Another possibility is a movement from N to S, where greater globalization is 
accompanied by more peaceful efforts by the dissident or excluded group---and where 
the government side could be said to free ride on the dissident’s efforts to achieve 
more peace. This might reflect less worker rights, reduced social protection, lower 
taxation for the rich, all accepted by the disadvantaged segment of society in return 
for an illusionary promise of greater fruits of globalization in the distant future, as 
witnessed in many developed and some developing countries in the last quarter of a 
century, as the median voter acquiesced to government expenditure cuts and greater 
wage restraint.  
  
 
